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Painting the Enemy in Motion: Film from both sides of the Pacific War 
On December 7, 1941, American eyes were focused on a new enemy. With the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, no longer were Americans concerned only with the European front, but 
suddenly an attack on American soil lead to a quick chain reaction. By the next day, a 
declaration of war was requested by President Roosevelt for "a date that will live on in infamy-
the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of 
the Empire of Japan ... ,,1 and the United States had a new enemy to face. Before the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, war related cinema had focused on the European front with films such as 
Confessions of a Nazi Spy (1939), Four Sons (1940), the Great Dictator (1940) and A Yank in 
the RAF (1941). All of these films stressed ideological themes, democracy versus Nazi 
dictatorship, brotherly love versus treachery, and overall American superiority. 
Then, in 1942, President Roosevelt created the Office of War Information (OWl), to 
make sure that the proper message was sent out to the American public. In order for America to 
win the war, the OWl had to be incorporated in every aspect of the American life. From the 
Sunday morning funnies to movies, it was vital that the OWl controlled exactly what the 
American people saw and felt towards the war. To do this, the government began creating 
propaganda posters, movies and cartoons. Although the message was essentially the same --- that 
1 John Morton Blum, V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World 
War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 1. 
the war would be long and hard but it would end in victory -- the messages for the Pacific 
conflict with Japan was more concerned with racial paradigms than ideology. While the racial 
paradigms were woven in all productions of the OWl, it was clearest in films, shown to both the 
public and the soldiers. 
Pre-war films concerning the Japanese always treated them as aliens within the United 
States and there was no strong attempt to separate the Chinese from the Japanese. 
Persistent from the earliest films was the idea of diabolical Orientals. They 
continually plotted and connived the destruction of America in general and white 
women in particular. The Orientals were never what they seemed to be. Ruthless 
and clever-one is tempted to conclude, more so than white men- they serve with 
great subtleti and infinite patience of the goal of the eventual mastery by the 
yellow race. 
The Adventures of Kathlyn (1910), The Yellow Menace (1916), and Typhoon (1921) were films 
that clearly portrayed this imagery associated with Orientals in general-never were they broken 
down by nationality, only that they were Asian. Nonetheless, the threat was portrayed as real: 
"The Japanese posed not only the threat of racial mongrelization ... [but also] great adaptability to 
western ways, [and] aggressiveness in economic competition," and consequently were an 
absolute and dangerous threat. 3 
The filmic story, in both cases, was based on the idea of racial inferiority. The desire to 
grasp racial imagery against the Japanese led many people in the United States to fear an all out 
race war was brewing on the horizon, where whites would have to fight against all the other 
nationalities of the world. As John Dower noted in his work, War without Mercy, World War II 
2Richard A. Oehling, "Hollywood and the Image of the Oriental, 1910-1950-Part I," 
Film and History, 8:3 (September 1978), 35. 
3Ibid., 33. 
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2 
was " ... a race war. It exposed raw prejudices and was fueled by racial pride, arrogance and 
,,4 
rage .... 
Governmental control of media during wartime was at first very lenient, if existing at all. 
With the failure of the Office of Facts and Figures, headed up by Archibald McLiesh, to try and 
control what the American public saw, very little was censored or specifically directed. 
However, once America was thrown into the war, the government needed a way to control and 
direct the publics' sympathy, anger and most importantly, hatred. 
In Executive Order 9182, President Roosevelt created the Office of War Information. 
Headed by a broadcaster and journalist, Elmer Davis, the OWl had many sectors, including 
sections specifically dedicated to the production of wartime movies and propaganda. The OWl 
incorporated the former failed attempt to control wartime media, the Office of Government 
Reports (OGR). This agency was very unpopular with politicians as well as the general public, 
after attack from republicans as being Roosevelt's propaganda house, even getting the nickname 
of OGRE (despite the claims by Republicans, the Office of Government Reports never acted as a 
proper propaganda agency).5 However, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President 
Roosevelt created the single entity of the OWl to make the Government's requests known to the 
public, and to offer assistance to the war effort.6 The OWl had a mission: To bring its message 
4John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1986), 5. 
5Ibid., 21. 
6Thomas B. Christie and Andrew M. Clark, "Framing Two Enemies in Mass Media: a 
content Analysis of U.S. Government Influence in American Film during World War II," 
American Journalism, 25:1 (Winter 2008),59. In World War I, the government created entity of 
the Committee on Public Information (CPI) that had controlled all forms of media available to 
shift public opinion and support towards the war and its efforts. Although with the forming of the 
commercial empire in America, the public had grown to be weary of the so-called 'truths' that 
the advertisements supposedly spoke of, which made public opinion about propaganda also 
3 
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to the people of the United States -- and with approximately eighty million Americans attending 
the movies a week, sixteen thousand theaters throughout the country that could seat eleven 
million people at one time -- the use of film as a method of propaganda was the most obvious 
choice. 
The Pacific War was a race war on all sides-from the Americans to the Japanese. 
America had a deep history with racism, and that racism became key to the Pacific War. Racist 
themes began to emerge quickly. The Japanese were seen as having no individual thought, of 
being tricky, sneaky and treacherous, also of lacking emotion, being ruthless and of being either 
subhuman or superhuman, but never being equal to the humanity of the Western forces. These 
racial imageries were clearest in three movies, Bataan (1943), Guadalcanal Diaries (1943) and 
Know Your Enemy-Japan (1945). These three movies stick true to all the racial stereotypes, and 
more. 
Released June 3, 1943, Bataan was considered MGM's response to Paramount's Wake 
Island. Produced by Irving Star and directed by Tay Garnett, the fictional story as of a real battle, 
the Battle of Bataan. The battle occurred shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Bataan and the 
US and Filipino forces on the island were attacked by Japanese planes. The Japanese attacks 
quickly cut off the US and isolated Filipino forces from outside reinforcement and supplies. 
The film Bataan opens with the scene of Americans retreating from the island of Bataan, 
all injured, tired and disheartened. Suddenly, Japanese planes bomb the retreating soldiers, 
killing innocent women and children, and destroying a Red Cross aid van. Desperate, the army 
sends a group of thirteen volunteers (two Filipinos, one sailor, an air force officer, a Latino, a 
relatively wary. The CPT had succeeded in generating hate and anti-German hysteria during 
World War I and the Roosevelt administration was unwilling to see a repeat. Nonetheless, after 
it was clear that war was on the horizon - notably in Europe - Roosevelt was very unwilling to 
create another such institution, prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. See Winkler, 5. 
4 
4 
black engineer, a sergeant and a West-Point soldier) deep into the jungle to slow the Japanese 
progression by destroying a key bridge. The thirteen men are slowly picked off by Japanese 
snipers, forever invisible and undefeatable. Despite destroying the bridge multiple times, the 
Japanese army, under the cover of night, is always there to repair it. After the air force officer is 
injured, he sacrifices himself by slamming an airplane into the bridge. After that, the Japanese 
begin all out attacks. 
The moment the Japanese reveal themselves, they are easily killed. They are far from the 
invincible force that they appeared when they were hidden. Quickly they shifted from 
superhuman to subhuman upon revealing themselves. In a red-light-green-light like game of 
deception, the Japanese army sneaks up on the remaining American heroes, seen as almost 
animal like. Once they are shown, the few Americans are able to kill hundreds of Japanese 
soldiers, with seeming ease. But finally, only three American heroes remain. The Japanese send 
a note telling the Americans that they would treat them nicely should they surrender, and 
promised their safety. Immediately after, however, one of the soldiers is killed. The next soldier 
is stabbed in the back by a Japanese soldier that was pretending to be dead. In the final climatic 
scene, the remaining American soldier plows down the approaching Japanese, leaving the 
audience with the final words of "Come and get it, suckers. We're still here-we'll always be 
here-come and get it.,,7 
Although fictional, Bataan was hailed widely as the most successful film for the portrayal 
of the American hero. The OWl hailed the film as an over-all success, stressing the democratic 
nature of the group of soldiers. Throughout the movie, superior officers listen carefully to the 
7 "Bataan," Directed by Tay Garnett (June 3, 1943). This sort of plot is very similar to 
monster movies-the monster is undefeatable as long as it is invisible, but the moment it leaps 
onto the screen, it can be killed with seeming ease. 
5 
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advice of the underlings. As the OWl noted, " ... Thus, the army reflects the democratic way of 
life-which is one way of demonstrating the difference between our ideology and the fascist 
doctrine."s Another thing the OWl praised about Bataan was " ... the thirteen Americans [were 
not] professional soldiers-they were soda jerks, salesmen, farmers and teachers before the war. 
The American soldier was the common man. Bataan illustrated that 'this is a people's army, 
fighting a people's war.",9 The OWl hailed Bataan as a useful film for inspiring the public and 
even suggested it for foreign release. 
Not only was Bataan successful with the government but with critics too. Bosley 
Crowther of the New York Times hailed Bataan because it actually portrayed the Black soldier, 
writing that "Kenneth Spencer has quiet strength and simple dignity as a Negro soldier from the 
engineers-a character whose placement in the picture is one of the outstanding merits of it .... ,,10 
Howard Barnes of the New York Herald Tribune wrote that Bataan was "a grim and 
uncompromising war film," 1 1 and that it "has heroic dimensions and a melodramatic and 
emotional intensity that cannot be ignored. Its tribute to the expendables who fought a desperate 
delaying action on a peninsula of the Philippines is as stirring as it is somber .... ,,12 The reviewer 
at Time said that "Bataan' s scenery is 'realistic' down to the last cartload of tropical foliage-
and its drama is constantly loud and overemphatic. But there are a few stretches when the 
SClayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Goes to War: How politics, 
Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies (New York: The Free Press, a Division of 
Macmillan, Inc., 1987), 258. 
9Ibid. 
lOKenneth Spencer was the actor who played one of the black soldiers in the film. 
IIJoe Morella, Edward Z. Epstein and John Griggs, Thefilms ofWWII: A Pictorial 
Treasure of Hollywood's War Years (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1973), 134. 
12 Ibid. 
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military situation calls for silence, the noisy sound track quiets down and, for a moment, 
incredibly enough, Hollywood's war takes on the tense, classic values of understatement.,,13 
Guadalcanal Diaries (1943) is a far more pungent film when it comes to rubbing 
Hollywood's stereotypes in the faces of the audience. The movie, based on a best-selling book of 
the same title, was directed by Lewis Seiler and produced by Bryan Foy and was released 
November 17, 1943. A few months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces had 
successfully captured several pacific islands, including the island of Guadalcanal. The island was 
important in providing a connection between New Zealand, Australia and the United States. 
American forces landed on the island on August 7, 1942 to reclaim the island, hoping to use it as 
a base to support their pacific campaign. The Allied forces overwhelmed the Japanese forces, 
and after several large battles and air strikes, the Japanese finally abandoned the island to 
American forces. 
The movie Guadalcanal Dairies opens with a boat full of soldiers ready to be delivered 
into battle. The soldiers are relaxing and cheerfully chatting. The main characters introduced to 
the audience is an ex-Cabbie from Brooklyn named Aloysius Potts (played by William Bendix), 
whose obsession with the Dodgers is disturbing, a tough veteran sergeant named Hook Malone 
(played by Lloyd Nolan), Don Davis (played by Richard Conte), a captain whose devotion to his 
men is strong, Soos Alvarez (played by Anthony Quinn), represents the minorities of America 
while only thinking of women awaiting him at home, and finally Richard Jaeckel starred as the 
young soldier, Johnny Anderson, who was entering battle for the first time. The ship, and the 
first few days arriving on the island are easy enough, with no injuries what-so-ever, and when the 
soldiers discover an abandoned Japanese base, they believe the island to be disserted, but at that 
13Ibid. 
7 
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moment, one soldier is killed by snipers. The tension began to build as a narrator explained that 
the Japanese were lurking around in the jungle, and the rest of the film was dedicated to 
showcasing Japanese treachery. During a stormy night, Potts wrestled with a tree branch in his 
sleep, and sheepishly explained that he thought it was a Japanese soldier, saying "I swore I could 
see his buck teeth.,,14 A young soldier shoots into the bushes on the same night, was 
reprimanded by his officers, and slowly goes back to his post, as the camera pans to show the 
audience the Japanese soldier hiding in the bushes. The next day, the young soldier is dead. 
Captured Japanese soldiers claimed that there were starving and dying soldiers on the beach, 
waiting to surrender. When a boat of men goes to capture the soldiers, they are ambushed by the 
Japanese, and only one soldier was able to escape alive. During an important battle scene, the 
young soldier, Anderson, turned to his sergeant and asked him how he felt about killing people. 
The sergeant replied, "Well, its kill or be killed -- besides, they ain't people.,,15 But despite that, 
the soldiers do not seem to take pleasure in their acts, and many of them longed for the comforts 
of home. The soldier who did not receive a letter from home wandered off into the forest in a fit 
of depression and was killed. As the fighting progressed, the soldiers discover the Japanese had 
hidden in caves, and the narrator explained to the audience "[the Japanese soldier] is a constant 
menace to our patrols. He must be driven out. .. the men behind the machine guns are fanatics, 
some are chained to the weapons. One by one, they must be blasted from the earth that hides 
them.,,16 
The Japanese in this film, much like Bataan, were always hiding. Whether it is hiding in 
the grass, in the jungle, in the trees, in the ocean, or in caves, the Japanese soldiers are always 
14"Guadalcanal Diaries," directed by Louis Sieler (November 17,1943). 
IsIbid. 
16Ibid. 
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hidden, but not invisible. The Japanese attack from under cover of night or jungle, and unlike 
Bataan, the Japanese soldiers in Guadalcanal Dairies does not attack all out. The Japanese 
soldiers are crowded into caves, almost as if to be shown as hiding rats. Along with that, racial 
descriptions that are associated with the Japanese, such as 'monkeys', 'buck-teeth', and other 
such words were common in the soldiers' and narrators' dialogue. There are even very subtle 
things such as an image of a Japanese soldier with glasses. When the Japanese begin dropping 
flyers to reassure their people of the Japanese victory, American soldiers make fun of them, as if 
to point out how stupid the Japanese are for creating propaganda in an American propaganda 
film. Another slight touch of irony is that while in Guadalcanal Diaries, when "The Japanese 
troops have withdrawn into the interior of the island, and the marines are in for a long tough 
battle. This strategy, praised when undertaken by American troops in Bataan and other movies, 
is presented as devious and unfair when done by the Japanese.,,17 
The OWl praised Guadalcanal Diaries as "the most realistic and outstanding picture" 
about the Pacific war, and on its portrayal of the Japanese enemy as formidable but not 
invincible. 18 Like Bataan, Gaudacanal Dairies was recommended for overseas distribution. 
And with critics it too was praised, especially by Bosley Crowther of New York Times, 
who noted that the opening audience" ... was visibly stirred and which, no doubt, had the 
impression that it was witnessing the battle of Guadalcanal as it was fought.,,19 He also said that 
" ... there is certainly no question that this picture is stirring and inspiring in many ways .... ,,20 
17Koppes, 259. 
I 8/bid. , 260. 
19Morella, 157. 
20/bid., 158. 
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Both Bataan and Guadalcanal Diaries were hailed by the OWl as successful war films, 
and were also examples of how easily the OWl would overlook the blatant racist portrayals of 
the Japanese. Although the OWl claimed to not want Japanese soldiers to become simply things 
for the Americans to kill, yet that was the image portrayed in both Bataan and Guadalcanal 
Diaries. Nobody ever objected, or even mentioned a possible change to the film makers. 21 
Although not subtle, the racist imageries in Bataan and Guadalcanal Diaries could potentially be 
missed. 
Throughout all of the wartime films about the Pacific front, several reoccurring themes 
appear. There were barely any films that talked about combat, and the only ones that did 
focused on the European front. The few films that existed talked about combat were" ... 
extremely redundant in their arguing their justification of America in war, this redundancy exists 
both within each film and from film to film,,22 but the majority of films were focused on 
"thematic concerns even propaganda may have been original imputice [sic] for production, but 
the end result is a body of films which creates and idealized world .. .it is a world governed by a 
metaphysic of perfect order, of universal truths of men, and of absolutes of good and evil.,,23 
In order for the OWl to achieve its message, it had to not only create the heroic 
American, but they also had to create the enemy. Often to make sure there was no confusion as 
to who was good and who was evil, American films used opposite attributes. While the 
American heroes were emotional, religious, peaceful and moderate, the Japanese and Germans 
were portrayed as dispassionate, atheist, hostile and fanatic. While the Germans and Japanese 
21Koppes, 258-259. 
22Kathryn Kane, Visions of War: Hollywood Combat Films of World War II (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: Umi Research Press, 1982), 145. 
23Ibid., 147. 
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were both enemies of the Americans, there was a difference. "In contrast to the 'good Gennan' 
and the occasional good Nazi, the Good Japanese were almost unheard of.,,24 
Unlike the Germans, the Japanese were portrayed by racial stereotypes. While the 
Gennan people were unwillingly put under the rule of the Nazis, there was never any question 
that the Japanese were evil, nor were the Japanese ever unwilling to follow an order. There were 
no good Japanese. Furthermore "no attempt was made to show a Japanese soldier trapped in 
circumstances beyond his control, or a fami! y man who longed for a home, or an officer who 
despised the militarists even if he supported the military campaign. This stands in sharp contrast 
to the portrayal of the German soldiers, who were often shown as decent human beings, distinct 
from the Nazis.,,25 
"By the spring of 1942, the racial epithets were flying fast; 'monkey' was the most 
common along with its variants 'monkey people' and 'ringtails.' When 'rat' was used, it was 
prefixed by 'yellow' or 'slant-eyed. ",26 The use of animals to describe the Japanese helped to 
create the inferiority and inhumanity of the Japanese. "Subhuman, inhuman, lesser human, super 
human- all that was lacking in the perception of the Japanese enemy was a human like 
oneself.,,27 Combined with the imagery of monkeys or rats, the Japanese were shown to be 
inhuman. The dehumanization of the enemy was specifically a tactic used on the portrayal of the 
Japanese. This tactic was highly successful, to the point that many soldiers fighting in the Pacific 
could not recognize the humanity of the Japanese. To the point that even Ernie Pyle, a claimed 
24Bemard F. Dick, Screen: The Anlerican World War II Film (Lexington, Kentucky: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1985),231. 
25Koppes, 254. 
26Dick, 230. 
27Dower,9. 
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"humanist" wrote after seeing Japanese prisoners in a fenced-in enclosure that "they were 
wrestling and laughing and talking just like normal human beings, and yet they gave me the 
creeps, and I wanted a mental bath after looking at them.,,28 Furthermore, he also wrote that "in 
Europe we felt that our enemies, horrible and deadly as they were, were still people, but out here 
I soon gathered that the Japanese were looked upon as something subhuman and repulsive; the 
way some people feel about cockroaches or mice.,,29 
Race became vital in the fighting of the Japanese. There was no good Japanese, and so 
the American Japanese were quickly put away, while the rest of the American society was meant 
to hate them. "The racist code words and imagery that accompanied the war in Asia were often 
exceedingly graphic and contemptuous. The Western allies persisted in their notion of the 
'subhuman' nature of the Japanese, routinely turning to images of apes and vermin to convey 
this.,,30 Racist phrases like "Slap that Jap" and "yellow terror" became popularized quickly. 
Prior to the war in the Pacific, Asians were seen as indistinguishable masses of identical clones, 
but with China's role of a vital and important ally in the Pacific War, American media had to 
define and highlight the differences between the 'good' Asians and the 'bad' ones.31 Generally, 
the Chinese were seen as peaceful, gentle, brave, honest, religious and fertile people while the 
Japanese were warmongering, treacherous, sly, cruel and brutal monsters. 
Another persistent image portrayed "the Japanese as naughty children who needed to be 
punished by the white Americans and Europeans. This exaggerated the contrast suggested a 
28Ibid., 78. 
29Ibid. 
30Ibid., 9. 
31Thomas Doherty, Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture and World War II 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 135. 
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hierarchical and paternal relationship that. .. existed between the United States and Japan.,,32 The 
odd mixture of paternalism and violent racism were intertwined in American portrayals of the 
Japanese. But, interestingly, these images were not meant to create hatred, just direct the natural 
proclivity toward hatred. "In Communique, the in-house weekly of the Hollywood Writers 
Mobilization, Nelson Poynter was asked 'is it true that the office of war information does not 
want pictures which will promote hatred of the Japanese and the Nazis?' 'No,' replied the 
OWl's Hollywood chief, 'properly directed hatred is of vital importance to the war effort",33 
Properly directed hatred was a very clear mission of the OWl, with their refusal to show 
images of the Emperor Hirohito, fearing that it would change the direction of the hatred towards 
the Japanese. Furthermore, the government used race and nationality as an enemy, rather than a 
leader, in order to justify the internment of the Japanese-Americans. The problem was that the 
properly directed hatred worked and by 1942, when polled, 73% of the American population 
believed the Japanese people were treacherous, 63% thought they were sly, 56% believed the 
Japanese were cruel and 46% believed they were warlike.34 
The effectiveness of this 'properly directed hatred' was clear. The Allied wartime leader, 
Admiral Haisley, known for advocating genocide of the Japanese, was met with popUlarity not 
only within the military but also within the American population. Admiral Haisley reported back 
to the American public saying that: "We are drowning and burning [them] all over the pacific 
32Kryustyn R. Moon, ''There's no Yellow in Red, White, and Blue": The Creation of 
Anti-Japanese Music During World War II," Pacific Historical Review, 72:3 (2000),339. 
33Doherty, 122. 
34Moon, 335. 
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and it is just as much pleasure to bum them as to drown them.,,35 And the majority of this 
acceptance came from film, as noted, "The movie goer is much in the position of a hypnotized 
person. Spellbound by the luminous rectangle before his eyes-which resembles the glittering 
object in the hand of a hypnotist-he cannot help succumbing to the suggestions that invade the 
blank of his mind. Film is an incomparable instrument of propaganda. ,,36 Even the OWl was 
convinced film was the key to injecting the proper message to the American population. "The 
easiest way to inject a propaganda idea into most peoples minds," admitted the director of the 
OWl Elmer Davis "is to let it go in through the medium of an entertainment picture when they 
do not realize they are being propagandized. ,,37 
In the end, Know Your Enemy-Japan was the last of the anti-Japanese films produced. 
Know Your Enemy-Japan was produced by Frank Capra and shown to United States soldiers 
first, as a requirement in training, and then later to civilians. Although conceptualized in 1942, 
because of scripting and production problems, Know Your Enemy-Japan was only released 
three-days after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima and, so, was obsolete from its release.38 
However, had the film come earlier, it would have been the most powerful, blatant and racist 
production to have met the hungry American audiences. Know Your Enemy-Japan sets up the 
OWl's view of Japanese history and culture, as well as establishing some sort of nation-wide 
conspiracy to take over the whole world. The film is so ridiculous, it stops just short of placing 
3SNancy Barcak Pavia, "Racism in Japanese and U.S. Propaganda," The Historian, 53:4 
(Summer 1994), 14. 
36W. Anthony Sheppard, "An Exotic Enemy: Anti-Japanese Musical Propaganda in 
World War II Hollywood," Journal o/the American Musicological Society, 54:2 (Summer 
2001),309. 
37Christie, 55. 
38William J. Blakefield, "A War Within: The Making of Know Your Enemy-Japan," 
Sight and Sound, 52 (1983), 128. 
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the cackling Japanese in a maniacal tower of darkness (with lightening and dark clouds, too). 
Know Your Enemy-Japan is the epiphany of racism towards the Japanese during World War II. 
Know Your Enemy-Japan is presented in form of a documentary, compiled of both 
American film and Japanese film shot by the Japanese themselves. Frank Capra knew very well 
that a documentary form would function to provide a truth, and so he used film taken from the 
Japanese too, to help his argument. John Grierson had defined documentary as 'the creative 
treatment of actuality,' but looking at the work of Leni Riefenstahl and her productions for the 
Nazi government (Triumph of the Will), a whole new vision of documentaries was present to the 
world. 
Frank Capra was shocked by the power of Triumph of the Will and made two 
decisions immediately. First he would use the footage to condemn the mob 
psychology so blatant in TOWs rally scenes, parades and tableaux. Second, Frank 
Capra believed that the documentaries of the series could equal-if not surpass-
Riefenstahl's accomplishments .... Although he would be working with actuality 
material, Capra knew that he could manipulate images and sound to prove that 
there were fundamental American reasons for joining the European [and Asian] 
struggle. Granted, the democracies had vacillated, but they would confront a 
demonic enemy and thereby experience their own 'triumph of the will. ,39 
The form of the movie would have been perfect to prepare soldiers to enter battle in 
Japan, since it supposedly gave facts on the Japanese 'character'. "All of the films assertions as 
well as its cinematic techniques are designed to instill fear and hatred of the Japanese in 
American viewers,,,4o and instill fear it does. With a bastardized history of Japan and Japanese 
culture is given as an explanation for why the war is going on (other than the attack on Pearl 
Harbor). The film presents so-called historical facts or proofs to show Japan's desire to dominate 
the world, using quotes from Japanese officials and past emperors' declarations such as: ''The 
39Peter C Rollins, "Frank Capra's Why We Fight film series and our American Dream," 
Journal of American Culture, 19:4 (Winter 1996), 81. 
40Claudia Springer, "Military Propaganda: Defense Department Films from World War 
II and Vietnam," Cultural Critique, 3 (Spring, 1986), 152. 
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Sword is our steel bible." This penchant was shown very early in the film, and again later on, by 
using a quote from Japan's first divine emperor, Jimmu, telling Japan to: "Let us extend the 
capital and cover the eight comers of the world under one roof.,,41 The purpose was to show 
Japan's world-dominating doctrine. 
Know Your Enemy-Japan did exactly what the OWl hoped for in films-presenting the 
Japanese enemy as inhuman and formidable, but defeat-able. The film stipulates that the 
Japanese soldier can carry as much weight as he himself weighs; and survi ve on little more than 
rice, making the Japanese appear very alien and inhuman. The film explains that Japanese are the 
same, like" ... photographic prints off the same negative. ,,42 The film also explains that there has 
been a cultural conspiracy to rule the world since the beginning of Japan; that they were always 
dangerous, and always wearing a mask of friendship before stabbing everyone else in the back. 
The film makes no attempt to see the Japanese as anything beyond a mass of culprits or 
murderers. Know Your Enemy-Japan uses imagery of Japanese children and women to show 
the evils of their society. "Japanese mothers are accused of lacking maternal feelings as they 
'accept the ashes of their dead soldiers without grief or sorrow , ",43 and that "Children who have 
learned their lessons well bear witness to Japanese militarism.,,44 
The film even claims that "Other Japanese traveled widely as tourists, photographing the 
sights of Honolulu and Seattle. Something to show the folks back home. Still others went to 
work in barber shops, strange barbers who didn't talk. This information was collected, studied, 
41"Know your Enemy-Japan," Directed by Frank Capra (August 9, 1945). 
42Ibid. 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid. 
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filed away in Tokyo, ready for the day the army decided to go into action." 4S Know Your 
Enemy-Japan also uses various animated clips from Walt Disney Studios to show just how evil 
the Japanese were and how hell-bent they were on world domination, such as the image of Japan 
as a giant octopus, slowly surrounding the islands in the pacific and then clamping down on 
them. As if the animations were not subtle enough, the narrator declares to the audience, 
"Defeating this nation is as necessary as shooting the mad dog in your neighborhood. ,,46 
There is no doubt that racism was imbedded deeply in American attitudes during World 
War II. And there is also no doubt that media influences the public's opinion. How easily people 
are influenced by what the media tells them? The American government needed to shift 
Americans' opinions, sharpen their hatred and direct their efforts in the war against Japan. 
Encouraging and using racist imagery was perfect for the American government to control 
media, and most importantly, Hollywood. Properly directed hatred -- and more importantly, 
properly directed racism, was the US government's key to winning the war against Japan. 
The idea of government influencing public opinion was not uniquely American. The 
Japanese government established their own propaganda effort under the authority of the Home 
Ministry, Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Welfare. This formed the Office of Public 
Information that functioned under the Home Ministry. The Home Ministry laid out instructions 
for the content of films which the Office of Public Information followed up on. Similar to the 
OWl, the Home Ministry wanted to push certain themes and avoid others. Among these, scenes 
of excess merriment and corruption were to be avoided. Making light of military matters were 
4S Ibid. This quote is especially ironic since in the beginning of the film, a caption told the 
audience that Japanese living in America were fully American citizens and were helping to fight 
for America just as much as everyone else-yet this quote says directly the opposite. 
46Ibid. 
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also strictly forbidden. Themes of patriotism, patience, fidelity, filial piety, resignation and most 
importantly, the "Spirit of Sacrifice" were common in wartime Japanese films. 
When Japan entered World War II, it did so as a nation that had not been conquered in its 
entire history. In fact, at the time of the Battle of Midway in 1942, Japan had gone nearly three-
and-a-half centuries without a single defeat. Not since the Japanese retreat from Korea in 1597 
had Japan's military been repelled. Japan had been at war since its occupation of Manchuria in 
1928. For nearly 14 years, Japan's military had enjoyed staggering success in its quest to create 
a Pacific Empire. When the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941, Japan and the United States were now officially combatants in the war. Pearl Harbor was 
an absolute success for the Japanese military machine. 
Japanese film propaganda had been produced since the Japanese invasion of China. In 
China, Japan's use of propaganda films was extensive. After Japan's invasion of China, movie 
houses were among the first establishments to be reopened.47 Most of the materials being shown 
were war newsreels, Japanese motion pictures, or propaganda shorts paired with traditional 
Chinese films.48 Movies were also used in other conquered Asian countries usually with the 
theme of Japan as Asia's savior against the Western tyrants or spoke of the history of friendly 
relations between the countries with films such as, The Japan You Don't Know.49 China was a 
favorite subject of Japanese film makers and many films had a romantic theme between a 
47Robert Spencer Ward, Asia for the Asiatics?: The Techniques of Japanese Occupation. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 56. 
48Ibid. 
4~avid Desser, "From the Opium War to the Pacific War: Japanese Propaganda Films of 
World War II," Film History, 7: 1 (1995), 39. 
18 
18 
Japanese officer and a Chinese woman.so This may have been a way for the Japanese to 
demonstrate their goodwill toward China and thus the greater realm of Asian nations being 
conquered. 
But Japanese films were very different from American wartime propaganda films in three 
distinctive ways: how the enemy was portrayed, what actions the hero takes, and, most 
importantly, for what audience was the film created. 
Although the differences in the first two would seem obvious (after all, the Japanese were 
by no means the Americans, or vise versa) what was surprisingly missing from Japanese films 
were blatant characterizations of the enemy. In Japanese wartime cinema, obvious portrayals of 
the 'enemy' were surprisingly absent; however, hovering in the background, distant and rarely 
pointed out one can still find 'the enemy' in Japanese films.sl ''There is simply no 'enemy' 
counterpart in Japanese films to the atrocities and subhuman 'Jap' beloved of Hollywood. Even 
when the Japanese undertook to produce explicit 'hate-the-enemy' films, they generally did this 
in the form of historical dramas depicting the onerous behavior of earlier generations of western 
imperialists in Asia."s2 The 'other' in Japanese films are simply those who are not Japanese 
(Chinese and other southeast-Asians), and unlike American films, 'others' were not necessarily 
'the enemy.' Japanese films, unlike the American wartime films made no attempt to make 'the 
enemy' seem as a strength that must be defeated -- rather as a pitiful weakling to be brushed 
aside. 
SOIbid. 
51Abe Mark Nornes and Kukushima Yukio, eds. The Japan/America Film Wars: WWII 
Propaganda and Its Cultural Contexts (Tokyo: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1994), 240. 
S2Desser, 45. 
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The value of Japanese propaganda film efforts were praised -- even by Japan's enemy, 
the United States: " ... after studying a number of Japanese wartime films for their propaganda 
potential during the war, Frank Capra is supposed to have said 'We can't beat this kind of thing. 
We can make films like these maybe once in a decade.",53 
This success was used in a purely propagandist film a year later in the film: Hawai Mare 
oki Kaisen (1942). The War at Sea From Hawaii to Malay, as is its English title, was directed by 
Kajiro Yamamoto. The film was made to commemorate the one year anni versary of the attack on 
Pearl Harbor -- the "Navy Spirit as culminated at Pearl Harbor.,,54 Yamoamoto carefully re-
created the years of preparation for the attack. The film showed the complete destruction of 
American ships by Japanese dive bombers and was the pinnacle of Japan's propaganda films. 
Despite the film's subject matter, Yamamoto put together an exquisite combination of real 
footage and battlefield reproductions using miniatures. The fake battle scenes, added in with the 
real footage, made it impossible for audiences (both American and Japanese) to tell which scenes 
had been created and what was the actual battle field. "So effective were these studio shots that 
after the war Occupation authorities mistook some of them for the real thing.,,55 
The War at Sea From Hawaii to Malay was a gigantic film in every sense of the word 
and cost of $380,000 to make, when the average first-class film was budgeted for $40,000.56 The 
film, however, was popular and made its investment back quickly. Yamamoto's film was used 
in the later years of the war as a means of boosting public morale. War at Sea/rom Hawaii to 
53Nomes and Yukio, 132. 
54Joseph L. Anderson and Donald Richie, The Japanese Film: Art and Industry 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 13l. 
55Ibid. 
56Ibid. 
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Malaya won the special prize by the Information Board the year it was released, and although 
non-fictional, it was presented in an almost fictional light. The films purpose was to inspire the 
Japanese to fight and it certainly did that.57 
Other films attempted to show an enemy with more detail, but ended up twisting the film 
to focus on the hero. In the film Tiger of Malaya (1943) -- although the enemy is British -- the 
main focus of the film is on the Japanese hero. The Tiger of Malaya, however, was unique in that 
it had a very 'caricature' like portrayal of the British Imperialists, showing acts of brutality. This 
film was important for its portrayal of the British Enemy, even if the majority of the film was 
devoted to the unity of the 'bandits' fighting the British. "As is clear from many of the hate-the-
enemy films, Britain, more than the United States, was the favorite target. ,,58 Other films, The 
Last Days of the British Empire, was a self explanatory ending of the war with Britain. A more 
unusual anti-British film, International Smuggling Game, depicted the British Consular Service 
running an opium smuggling ring, with which the British consul, Mr. Perkins, weaves a 
Machiavellian scheme for subduing Japan as the British had subdued China. 59 
The Japanese film industry instead focused inward -- producing" ... some of the most 
vivid evocations of the ideal Japanese life and behaviors.,,6o All genres of Japanese film during 
the war followed the same ultranationalist themes: filial piety, fidelity, patriotism, patience and 
resignation. The "Spirit of Sacrifice" was a key point in all films of the time. The difference 
between 'self' and 'other' in Japanese films was stressed greatly. However, unlike in American 
57Desser, 40. 
58Ibid., 43. 
59 Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion -- World War II (New York: 
Chelsea House Publishers, 1976), 242. 
60Desser, 43. 
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films where the 'other' is a sub-human creature to be defeated or annihilated, the representation 
of otherness in Japanese cinema was simply a community that did not share the nationalist 
thinking of the Japanese. "Many Japanese war films have no explicit enemies at all; the focus 
remains almost exclusively on the pure self. Others portray enemies only abstractly in the form 
of a distant plane, a running figure, the chatter of a machine gun or boom of field artillery.,,61 
The foe is simply identified as "they." 
The majority of Japanese films were directed at these others, to fall under the protection 
of the Japanese "co-prosperity sphere". The whole focus of most films were on self and other, 
rarely the enemy. Missing from Japanese films was "the element of caricature which, however 
dishonestly, managed to frighten a good many westerners, and which American hate-the-enemy 
films always insisted upon.,,62 
Although painting a story of 'self' and 'other' in a time of war when the focus should be 
on the enemy might seem strange, but the Japanese believed in the purity of the Yamamoto race. 
The enemy was not the important factor -- it was how the Japanese people were which led to a 
simple conclusion: as long as the Japanese were pure, the enemy would fall, so it was not 
important to focus on the enemies. 
Hate-the-enemy portrayals in Japanese cinema was far less virulent and shocking than 
many of the notorious instances in Hollywood films.63 This fact, however, leads to an interesting 
observation about how the war was waged. Japanese cinema was almost wholly at 
61John W. Dower, Japan in War & Peace: Selected Essays (New York: New Press, 
1993),39. 
62Nornes and Yukio, 135. 
63In other forms of propaganda, the Japanese did dehumanize the enemy and call for their 
extermination. In wartime cartoons as well as popular colloquialisms, for example, it was 
commonplace to depict the Americans and British as demons, devils and monsters. Exhortations 
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at odds with the war waged by the Japanese military; and the same holds true for 
the obverse, Hollywood. This is to say, that the pan-Asianism ... expressed in 
[Japanese films] .. .is belied by the extreme exploitation and violence directed 
against other Asians. Similarly, the often virulent racism seen in American World 
War IT combat films is belied not only by American conduct in World War IT 
(humane treatment of POWs, for instance) but also by American society itself." 
As Western scholars have critiqued Hollywood's racist propaganda, they are perhaps guilty of a 
kind of reverse discrimination because these same scholars praise Japanese cinema for its lack of 
race-baiting and prejudice. Scholars have failed "to include a consideration of the actual war 
23 
waged by the respective combatants. A full appreciation for Japanese war-time filmmaking must 
not only take into consideration the full range of Japanese cinema of the period, but also the war 
in support of which the films were made. ,,64 
During the American Occupation of Japan, headed by the Supreme Commander for 
Allied Powers (SCAP), films that were deemed anti-American, anti-Democratic, or simply 
'unfit' for the new Japan, were completely destroyed. Banned subject included any criticisms of 
the allied countries from any time even before the war. Any form of imperial, anti-ally media 
was destroyed, including a vast number of films. Those that are left are those who fit within the 
SCAP guidelines -- meaning that they did not necessarily fit with the true portrait of World War 
IT Japanese perspective. 
Dawn of Freedom is one of the very few films that survived the Occupations 'purge' of 
media. The story of how the film survived in and of itself is a extraordinary tale: the only 
surviving copy of the film was captured by the Filipino Resistance on orders from General 
Douglas MacArthur. They took the film from a theatre where it had just finished showing and 
hid the prints in various cargo, from mangos to horse feed and smuggled the film into Australia 
to kill the "'devilish Anglo-Americans' were uttered with mounting fervor as the Allied powers 
closed in on the home islands." Dower, 39-40. 
64Desser, 45. 
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via truck, push-cart, boat and submarine. Dawn of Freedom in fact, is one of only three of the 
films that were lucky enough to survive the purging of Japan. Beyond its miraculous survival 
story, it was also unique because it was one of the first Japanese-Philippine "co-produced" films. 
Of course, the Filipinos working on the film were often under the gun, literally, and American 
POW s were used in the film, against their will. 
The story of Dawn of Freedom focuses on the Filipino town of Manila. The film covers 
the surrender of the town to Japanese troops by American forces. In the film, a child, little 
Tony's brother is serving in the Army, and he writes to him, telling him to bring him back an 
enemy (Japanese) helmet. But soon, he realizes he was wrong when he is injured by an American 
military officer and receives a life-saving blood transfusion by a Japanese soldier. Later in the 
film, his brother is murdered by an American officer. Before dying, the brother writes a message 
on his helmet telling his little brother that " ... the real enemies are the Americans,,65 
Dawn of Freedom was received well in Japan, as reviewer Tsumura Hideo from Eiga 
Hyoron complimented "the quality of [Leonardo Salcedo] being slaughter in the mountains by an 
[American] plot" and gave overall good reviews about the movie, calling the movie an attempt to 
"create a new sublime beauty which can only be deprived from beauty of cruelty,,66 It was also 
rich with images of the Japanese 'self' and the American 'enemy': ''The Japanese portrayed 
themselves as ethical, benevolent liberators, while the Americans are vicious and bloodthirsty.,,67 
Through the Filipino 'others' in the film, the audience can 'discover' the true nature of the two 
forces, like little Tony. To other Asians watching this film, the message is clear: American 
Imperialists are the enemy, under Japanese rule, you will find betterment. 
65Nomes and Yukio, 241. 
66Ibid., 240. 
67Ibid., 241. 
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But the Japanese were not making their films to necessarily be shown to Japanese people. 
In fact, Japanese produced films were shown in Japanese territories in Southeast Asia and China. 
For example, the film China Moon is about a Chinese orphan who falls in love with a Japanese 
Naval Officer. It had three different endings, but only one ending was seen in Japan, the other 
two endings were shown in China or the rest of Southeast Asia. In the Chinese ending, the 
couple lives together, happily ever after. In the Southeastern Asian ending, the Japanese Naval 
officer saves his love from committing suicide. But the Japanese ending shows her committing 
suicide successfully. This may seem confusing at first, but when we look at the messages the 
Japanese were trying to send to these places it makes a lot of sense. 
To the 'others' in China, the message is clear: Unite with Japan, and you will be happy. 
To the 'others' in southeast Asia, the message is that Japan will save them. But to the Japanese 
people, the focus is on 'self,' and the purifying of the Japanese Naval Officer from the 'other' of 
the Chinese. The enemy presence in the film is simple: the Japanese Officer would not have 
been there if the enemy wasn't. But the enemy never makes an appearance, subtle or otherwise. 
Here we have the split in Japanese and American propaganda films. The focus of 
Japanese films is on self, but the Americans focus on the other. The war-time climate can fuel 
the intensity of racial hatred through a hardening of boundaries "along the dichotomous split 
between 'us' and 'them.' ,,68 The strength and power that the Americans and Japanese fought 
with could be partially attributed to the way they viewed their respective enemy. The brutality of 
the Pacific War proved truly that if "you call a people 'barbarian' ... or you call a group 
68Nornes and Yukio, 100. 
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'criminals'" you can "suspend just laws of Decency and behave towards them in an otherwise 
criminal way.,,69 
69Ibid., 99. 
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